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The market reactions to share repurchase announcements on the JSE: 
an event study 
Abstract 
This study examines the market reactions to share repurchase announcements made by companies listed on the 
Johannesburg Stock Exchange from the years 2003 to 2012. The authors use an event study methodology and the 
Capital Asset Pricing Model to determine if there was an announcement effect when a share repurchase announcement 
is made. The analyses reveal that consistent with signalling theory and the announcement effect, share repurchase 
announcements are associated with positive abnormal returns. The average abnormal return and cumulative average 
abnormal return noted was 0.46% and 3.81%, respectively, for the event period (t-20, t+20). There was an observable 
trend of declining share prices before the share repurchase announcement. The authors also found no significant 
evidence that repurchasing firms have market timing ability when executing a share repurchase announcement. From a 
value investor’s perspective, a share repurchase program conveys a very strong signal of a healthy company. 
Keywords: market reaction, share repurchase announcement, average abnormal returns, cumulative average abnormal 
returns. 
JEL Classification: G00.
Introduction
Companies that accumulate cash quickly may find it 
difficult to reinvest the cash at attractive rates of 
returns. Such companies may also be faced with the 
difficult task of finding new investment 
opportunities which benefit its shareholders. Bhana 
(2007) states that when companies plan their 
allocation of any surplus capital resources, they are 
faced with two major options; they may decide to 
invest the funds in order to advance their business 
goals, which include capital expenditure, retaining 
funds for working capital or engaging in 
acquisitions and mergers. The second option is that 
they may decide on returning cash to shareholders in 
the form of dividends, debt repayment or share 
repurchases. In this study, we focus on share 
repurchases and its impact on share prices.  
A share repurchase allows a company to reinvest in 
itself by increasing the proportion of shares that it 
owns thereby reducing the number of its shares in 
the market. Share repurchases have become an 
important financial policy for listed companies for 
the past twenty years in the United States (Bhana, 
2007). The reason for the increase in this form of 
activity is motivated by the use of open market 
repurchases programs, where no additional premium 
is paid to the current share price when repurchasing 
a company’s shares. Both Skinner’s (2008) research 
into the US markets and Von Eije and Megginson’s 
(2008) research into the European markets indicate 
a trend that share repurchases are becoming a 
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dominant method of replacing dividends and 
distributing corporate cash flows to shareholders. 
In the context of the economic climate, Grullon and 
Ikenberry (2000) found that share repurchases will 
likely remain the dominant transaction in the future 
as more countries adopt enabling regulations such as 
relaxed tax legislations and corporate laws. Grullon 
and Ikenberry (2000) state that other factors 
affecting share repurchase program activity include 
the level of market prices and the underlying 
condition of the economy, citing that when share 
prices fall announcements of share repurchases rise. 
Literature reveals that other motivation for a share 
repurchase is that managers seem to believe that the 
shares are undervalued, such as Vermaelen (1981), 
Stephens and Weisbach (1998), Ikenberry, 
Lakonishok and Vermaelen (2000), Grullon and 
Ikenberry (2000), Bhana (2007), Lo, Wang, and 
Yeh (2008), Skinner (2008) and Von Eije and 
Megginson (2008). However, De Ridder (2009) 
points out that the knowledge of how firms actually 
execute repurchases and impact of repurchases on 
the market have not yet been fully explored due to 
data constraints such as access to credible execution 
data and models for analysis purposes. 
Studies on share repurchases have long been 
practised in the developed markets, such as 
Ikenberry and Vermaelen (1996) and Mishra, 
Racine and Schmidt (2010). However, due to the 
operating nature of these developed markets, their 
size, the differences in the rules and regulations that 
govern such markets and the maturity of the stock 
exchanges, their findings may not be applicable to 
the developing markets such as South Africa. In the 
South African context studies have either been 
conducted soon after the Johannesburg Securities 
Exchange (JSE) officially allowed share repurchases 
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in October 2000 or were not conducted over a long 
enough period to yield any reliable results. Due to 
the limited availability of studies in this area in 
South Africa, this study adds to the literature on 
share repurchases. 
Our study, thus, aims to examine the market 
reaction surrounding the announcements of share 
repurchases by listed companies on the JSE in order 
to establish whether there is an “announcement 
effect”, which may react in one of three ways: 
1. positive reaction: characterized by an increase in 
the share price; 
2. negative reaction: characterized by a decrease in 
the share price; or 
3. no reaction: characterized by not responding at all. 
This study utilized a data set of share purchase 
announcements and share prices covering the period 
from January 2003 to August 2012. Previous studies 
conducted in the field of share repurchases on the 
JSE employed shorter periods (i.e., from 6 months 
to 5 years). This study used a total of 9 years and 
8 months of data under the assumption that a 
longer period will yield more reliable and 
conclusive results. 
1. Literature review 
Firms buy back their own shares for various 
reasons. Some of the reasons found in the literature 
include managerial intentions to signal to the market 
that the shares are undervalued, to ward of potential 
takeover raiders, to distribute cash through repurchase 
instead of dividend payments, to use repurchased 
shares to settle outstanding options and convertible 
securities to avoid dilution, to distribute excess cash 
where there is no investment opportunity, and to adjust 
financial leverage (Lee et al., 2010). This study 
focuses on the market reaction to share repurchases 
concentrating on three common threads for 
repurchasing shares, namely, signalling theory, long-
term stock performance and market timing. 
The signalling theory can be regarded as 
management’s “signal” to the market that the 
current market price of the share is undervalued. 
This presupposes the existence of information 
asymmetry between management and investors. The 
greater the degree to assess the value of a firm, the 
more likely it is that information asymmetry may 
obscure the true value of a firm and hence it is 
unlikely that the firm may be undervalued. The long 
term stock performance following a share 
repurchase announcement determines if firms 
experience positive abnormal returns afterwards and 
if firms repurchase their shares after a series of 
consecutive price declines. Market timing of share 
repurchases determines if firms can re-acquire 
shares at a lower price. The following sections will 
provide a brief discussion on each of the three 
common threads that have been described above.  
1.1. Market undervaluation as a motive for share 
repurchases. Grullon and Ikenberry (2000) noted 
that researchers tend to study the markets in search 
of an explanation that describes some trend or 
activity that can explain a phenomena. The growing 
trend of share repurchases is regarded as a new 
phenomenon and researchers such as Grullon and 
Ikenberry (2000), Dittmar (2000), Dobbs and Rehm 
(2005) and Lee et al. (2010) offer explanations to 
this phenomena stating that markets respond to 
announcements of share repurchases because they 
offer new information, sometimes called a “signal” 
about a company’s future and, hence, its share price.
Grullon and Ikenberry (2000) offer two different 
versions to the “signalling” explanation. The first 
version states that repurchases are intended to 
convey a firm’s expectation of future increases in 
earnings and cash flow. This is also known as a 
positive signal, indicating that management has 
correctly forecasted future cash flow and does not 
need the excess cash to cover future commitments 
such as capital expenditures or interest payments. 
The second version is that management is not 
attempting to convey new information to the market 
about a company’s future and, hence, its share price, 
but is instead expressing its disagreement on how 
the market is pricing their current performance. 
Grullon and Ikenberry’s study is based on 
investors making rationale decisions; therefore, 
they do not allow feelings/emotions to cloud their 
decision. In the same light, they opine that managers 
will buy back shares when they feel it is too low. 
This is management’s view that the share is 
undervalued. Isa, Ghani and Lee (2011) provide 
support to this argument by stating that information 
asymmetry (where managers within the firm have 
better information than outside investors), which 
in the context of share repurchases, means that 
firms will buy back shares when they perceive or 
observe that the market is not providing the correct 
value to the firm. 
Jiang and Koller (2011) offer a different explanation 
to “signalling” theory stating that a negative signal, 
i.e., management’s view that the share is 
undervalued, could indicate a failure of management 
to find sufficient value-creating investment 
opportunities. However, studies on share repurchase 
motives by Asquith and Mullins (1986), Ikenberry 
and Vermaelen (1996), Dittmar (2000), Lee and Rui 
(2007), Bhana (2007), De Ridder (2009) and Lee et 
al. (2010) indicate that there may be ulterior motives 
behind the decisions to repurchase shares, such as: 
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tax benefits, distributing excess cash, and adjusting 
capital structure. Companies may also repurchase 
their shares to reduce the supply of their shares in 
the market or to eliminate any threats of unwanted 
takeover attempts by corporate raiders when the 
shares are traded at a low value. Lee et al. (2010) 
state that if the share is undervalued, potential 
raiders may also be attracted to take over the 
company. Management may then decide to 
repurchase shares so that the share price will adjust 
upwards to the correct level for the benefit of 
shareholders or to dismay the raider.  
Lee et al. (2010) further argue that signalling 
information to correct the share valuation and evade 
outside takeover attempts of undervalued firms is 
more apparent under conditions of strong market 
monitoring circumstances. If there is no market 
monitoring, management may not be under pressure 
to release private information and share price may 
not respond to actions such as repurchase 
announcements. In this instance, the raider may also 
not benefit from taking over the undervalued firm 
since share price may not increase in the absence of 
market monitoring. 
When announcing a share repurchase program, Lee 
and Rui (2007) note that managers often make 
statements that their share is “undervalued” or a 
“good buy” or “prices don’t reflect the true value of 
the firm”. The authors support the study by 
Ikenberry et al. (2000), who found that over a four 
year period on perceived undervalued shares there 
were excess returns of 12.14%. In an attempt to 
focus on mispricing, Ikenberry et al. (2000) also 
considered the book-to-market ratio of companies 
when they announced their repurchase programs. 
Companies with high book-to-market ratios are 
often viewed as “value” stocks and in such cases, 
perceieved undervaluation is likely to be the 
primary factor in the decision to repurchase 
shares. For stocks with low book-to-market ratios, 
which are known as “growth” stocks, 
undervaluation seems less likely to be the dominant 
motivating factor. 
Share repurchase study by Isa et al. (2011) using an 
event study on the Malaysian Stock Exchange of 
149 firms over the period 2001 to 2005 showed a 
positive market reaction to the actual repurchase of 
shares. The authors found that the pre-event 
abnormal returns and the event days abnormal 
returns clearly suggest the existence of a signalling 
effect of the repurchase. They also found that the 
signalling effect is larger for small firms compared 
to larger ones. 
Based on the review of the literature above, 
undervaluation can be viewed as a dominant motive 
to executing a share repurchase corporate action in 
any given market and not just in developed markets. 
However, when firms make repurchase 
announcements, the market expects that they will 
follow the repurchase program and experience a 
more desirable share performance following the 
announcement date (Chang et al., 2010). 
1.2. Long-term performance of open-market 
repurchase programs. Accessing long-term 
abnormal price performance can be very sensitive to 
performance benchmarks. A common method 
among the literature suggests a simple buy-and-hold 
return (BHR) should be used to measure long-run 
abnormal stock returns. Buy-and-hold abnormal 
returns (BHARs) are calculated relative to matched 
control firms based on both firm size and book-to-
market value (BTMV).
Vermaelen’s (1981) initial study of 243 open market 
announcements finds that firms have been 
experiencing negative abnormal stock price 
performance prior to the open market repurchase. In 
the three months preceeding the repurchase, their 
share prices have underperformed the market by 
about 7%. The repurchase of shares produces a gain 
of little more than 3%, but prices retreat about 1% 
during the following three months, resulting in an 
apparent gain of 2%.  
Ikenberry et al. (2000) re-examined long term 
market performance using a three factor model and 
a sample of 1,060 Canadian firms. The findings 
demonstrated abnormal performance over the three 
year period after the share repurchase announcement 
and excess returns to be 0.587% per month were 
achieved (7% per year). For growth firms, excess 
returns of about 3.3% per year were achieved over 
the three-year period following the announcement 
while value firms earned excess of 9.1% per year. 
In another study by Chan, Ikenberry and Lee (2004), 
the authors examined long-horizon returns of over 
4,000 open market share repurchase programs 
announced by US firms from 1980 to 1996, 
reporting evidence of abnormal returns. The study 
also found some evidence of excess performance by 
growth shares. The authors also found evidence of 
higher long-run abnormal returns when companies 
actually repurchase shares in the first year of the 
repurchase program, particularly for value shares. 
A study of repurchase programs by firms that are 
listed on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), 
the American Stock Exchange (the “AMEX”) and 
the NAS-DAQ was conducted by Yook (2010), with 
a sample that consisted of 9,551 repurchase 
programs that were announced between the period 
1994 and 2007. The author found strong evidence of 
significant abnormal long-term performance of 
Investment Management and Financial Innovations, Volume 13, Issue 1, 2016
194
infrequent repurchasers who actually repurchase 
shares during the first four quarters following their 
announcements versus frequent repurchasers. 
An analysis by Bhana (2007) of long-term 
performance of South African firms listed on the 
JSE during the period from October 2000 to March 
2003, involved in 117 open market share 
repurchases, has shown that despite managers’ 
frequent claims of undervaluation when announcing 
share repurchases, the return in the immediate days 
following the announcement is relatively small. This 
suggests that either the managers are being overly 
optimistic relative to the market about the firm’s 
value or alternatively the market is wrong in 
responding and is, thus, underreacting to the 
repurchase signal. The possibility also exists that the 
market is slow in responding to the undervaluation 
signal contained in the repurchase announcements. 
The author found that using the buy-and-hold 
strategy, the three-year abnormal returns following 
the announcement was 14.35%. Companies with 
high book-to-market ratios that announce 
repurchase programs provided a three-year 
abnormal return of 32.78%. 
1.3. Timing ability when executing share 
repurchase programs. Brockman and Chung’s 
(2001) study of the bid-ask spread analyzed more 
than 5,000 share repurchases in 181 different firms 
on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange between the 
years 1992 to 1999. Their findings indicate that 
repurchasing firms have market timing ability. 
Furthermore, they identified the important 
determinants of this market timing ability to be 
short-term interest rate, the firm’s cash flow and the 
frequency of share repurchases.
Zhang (2005) conducted a study on repurchasing 
firms on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange from the 
period September 1993 to August 1997, analyzing 
135 firms and 800 repurchase events, stating that 
firms display market timing ability by 
repurchasing shares after a 20-day period of 
negative share price performance. Zhang (2005) 
also concluded that the market reacts more 
favorably to small and value firms when they 
make actual share repurchases. 
Furthermore, Ginglinger and Hamon (2007) 
examined share repurchases for 352 firms in France 
from the period 2000 to 2002, finding that 
repurchasing firms have market timing ability; 
meaning that these firms repurchased shares at a 
price lower than that paid by other investors. Their 
evidence suggests that firms act against market 
trends, executing their repurchases to take 
advantage of falling prices. This finding reaffirms 
the importance of timing skills as the repurchase 
would be expected to occur on trading days when 
prices are falling and/or immediately after a fall in 
the price. Managers who exercise timing skills, 
would expect to observe price trends in the trading 
days after the announcement day. 
In summary, the evidence suggests that firms not 
only time their repurchase program announcements, 
but also actual share repurchases to buy back their 
shares at favorable prices. In line with the above 
brief literature review, this study aims to examine 
the market reaction surrounding the announcement 
of share repurchases made by listed companies on 
the JSE of South Africa. By examining the market 
reaction we were able to establish whether there was 
an “announcement effect”. This question was 
answered by examining the Average Abnormal 
Return (AAR) and the Cumulative Average 
Abnormal Return (CAAR) when a share repurchase 
announcement was made.  
The following research questions have been 
proposed: 
1. What type of abnormal returns is associated with 
share repurchase announcements on the JSE? 
2. Is there a significant price effect in the pre-
announcement period? 
The following hypotheses were tested: 
H0: There is no significant difference between the 
means of the AAR in the post-announcement period 
and pre-announcement period.  
H1: There is a significant difference between the 
means of the AAR in the post-announcement period 
and pre-announcement period. 
3. Do firms display market timing ability when 
repurchasing their shares?  
The following hypotheses were tested: 
H0: There is no significant difference in timing share 
repurchase announcements. 
H1: There is a significant difference in timing a 
share repurchase announcement. 
2. Research methodology 
The research method for this study was based on the 
event study methodology used by Zhang (2005), 
Chang et al. (2010), Lin et al. (2011) and Isa et al. 
(2011) in their research on the market reactions and 
open-market share repurchase announcements. 
Konchitchki and O’Leary (2011) describe an 
event study methodology as a theoretical 
framework based on the efficient markets theory, 
which states that the price of a share includes all 
relevant information that is available to the 
market. As a result, when share repurchase 
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announcements are made by companies they 
provide the market with information that has 
already been factored into the share price. 
Secondary data were sourced and analyzed from 
existing financial databases such as INET Bridge, 
BFA, the South African Reserve Bank, National 
Treasury and the JSE website. This study was 
quantitative in nature and covered the period from 
2003 to 2012. The unit of analysis was the share 
price of JSE listed companies that made a share 
repurchase announcement within the test period. 
The population of the study was all companies listed 
on the JSE between the years 2003 and 2012. This 
period was chosen for three reasons, namely:  
1. This covers a period when firms were allowed 
to repurchase their shares. Blouin, Raedy, and 
Shackelford (2007) noted that firms needed time 
to adjust their payout policies of dividends to 
share repurchases following adjustments to tax 
reforms. Thus, this study chose 2003 as the start 
to the test period to allow for adjustments in 
payout policies. 
2. The period of the study starts from where 
Bhana’s (2007) study ended. 
3. This period was chosen for convenience as the 
data for companies in the sample that performed 
a share repurchase was readily available from 
2003 onwards. 
Companies which were initially listed, but later de-
listed for whatever reason during this time period 
were exlcuded. This study, therefore, lends itself to 
survivorship bias. The focus was on the main board 
of the JSE and excluded companies listed on the 
Alternative Exchange (ALTX). This exclusion may 
not have a significant impact on the findings since 
the combined market capitalization of these 
companies is smaller relative to the rest of the 
sample (Lemmon and Zender, 2008).  
Announcements on share re-purchases are made 
through the Stock Exchange News Service (SENS), 
an electronic notice board and information system 
designed to ensure that price-sensitive 
announcements can be received timeously by 
investors and analysts. The daily closing share 
prices for each of the companies in the sample was 
downloaded from the McGregor BFA database for 
the period January 2003 up to and including 31 
August 2012. 
A content search was conducted for all corporate 
actions relating to share repurchases. During the 
period from 1 January 2003 to 31 August 2012, a 
total of 264 announcements were made by 99 listed 
companies on the JSE relating to share repurchases. 
There were two types of share repurchase 
announcements that are tracked on the McGregor 
BFA database. The first is “specific” share purchase 
and the second is “general” share repurchase. 
In a “specific” share repurchase the company 
repurchases its shares from specific or defined 
shareholders. In a “general” or “open market”, share 
repurchase, the company repurchases its shares from 
the general market where the number of listed 
shares are then withdrawn. This study only focused 
on open-market or ‘general’ share repurchases. 
Konchitchki and O’Leary (2011) state that an “event 
window” indicates the number of days before and 
after the announcement date over which the 
abnormal returns are accumulated. Zhang (2005) 
and Lin et al. (2011) used the market model and an 
event window of 41 trading days from 20 days 
before to 20 days after with day 0 being the event 
day. The market model to obtain abnormal returns 
that have been used by Isa et al. (2011) uses an 
event window that starts from 20 days before the 
announcement and 20 days after the announcement 
(-20, +20) for 41 days. The event window in this 
study starts from 20 days before the announcement 
to 20 days after the announcement (-20, +20). The 
repurchase announcement day was designated as 
“day 0”, therefore, the event period was for 41 days. 
To calculate the abnormal return using the event 
study methodology, the Capital Asset Pricing Model 
(CAPM) was used. The daily return per share is 
calculated using the following equations listed 
below which has been adapted from Miller and 
Ward (2011): 
1
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                                                 (1) 
where: Rit = daily return of the share i on trading day t;
Pit = closing price of the share i on trading day t;
Pit-1 = closing price of the share i on trading day t-1. 
The model’s parameters such as beta (ȕ) were 
estimated using the 60 monthly data returns against 
the All Share Index (ALSI), prior to the event day. 
The daily AR for each share on each event day was 
calculated as follows: 
ARit = Rit – ȕiRmt,                                                    (2) 
where: ARit = abnormal return of the share i on trading 
day t; Rit = return on the share i on trading day t; ȕiRmt =
beta * the return on the market on trading day t.
The abnormal returns were then averaged to obtain 
the daily AAR as follows: 
AARt = 1
1
,
n
iti
AR
n  ¦                                           (3) 
where n = number of firms on trading day t.
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To estimate the CAAR surrounding the event day, a 
benchmark of 100% was set for the day before the 
announcement (t-1). The CAAR was calculated 
using a multiplicative model which combines the 
effect of two factors and calculates the product of 
the isolated effects of each factor. The calculation is 
as follows: 
CAARt+1 = (1 + CAARt0) u(1 + AARt1) – 1.              (4)
The estimation period in this study was split into 
sub-windows which were defined to examine the 
AAR. Researchers using event studies in share 
repurchases have used a range for the sub-windows. 
Table 1 below shows related studies on share 
repurchases and some characteristics. Different 
researchers used different sub-windows in their 
analysis; although, there were some similarities and 
overlaps. 
Table 1. Share repurchase related studies and some characteristics 
Author Topic Number of firms Sample period Number of sub-windows List of sub-windows
Zhang (2005) 
Share price performance following actual 
share repurchases 
135 1993-1997 3 
(-20,-1)
(0,2)
(0,20)
Chang et al. 
(2010)
Does prior record matter in the wealth 
effect of open-market share repurchase 
announcements? 
1,741 1986-2005 4 
(0,1)
(0,3)
(-1,2)
(-2,2)
Lee et al. (2010) 
An empirical analysis of European stock 
repurchases 
512 1990-2005 3 
(-1,0)
(0,0)
(-1,+1)
Isa et al. (2011) 
Market reaction to actual share 
repurchases in Malaysia 
149 2001-2005 4 
(-20,-1)
(0,2)
(3,20)
(-20,20)
Lin et al. (2011) 
Stock repurchase announcements and 
stock prices evidence from Taiwan 
413 2000-2008 1 (100,300) 
To determine the statistical significance of the price 
effect in the pre-announcement period, t-statistics 
were used to examine the AAR. The t-statistic for 
the AAR before the event (t-20) up to the day before 
the event (t-1) was calculated. The results were 
compared to the t-statistic for the AAR after the 
event (t+1) up to the end of the event window (t+20) 
to determine if there was a significant difference, 
using a 95% confidence interval. 
This study used the following three sub-windows: 
i (t-20, t-1) – 20 days before the event to 1 day 
before the event; 
i (t 0, t+2) – the event day plus 2 days after the 
event; and 
i (t 0, t+20) – the event day plus 20 days after the 
event.
A one-sample t-test was used to compare the mean 
of the AAR in each sub-window to the known value, 
which was the population mean. 
3. Research results 
This section presents the findings of the research; 
the first part describes the initial sample to gain 
an understanding of the two different types of 
share repurchase announcements (specific and 
general), and the second part provides descriptive 
statistics of the final sample.  
The study only focused on general (open market) 
share repurchase announcements. As a result, the 
initial sample of 264 share repurchase 
announcements has been reduced to 195 share 
repurchase announcements. A final sample of 167 
share repurchase announcements made by 62 
companies, free from unrelated events, was used in 
the final analysis. Table 2 below shows the 
proportion of announcements per sector per calendar 
year. The size of the repurchase is split between 
specific and general share repurchase. 
Table 2. Total share repurchase announcements per sector per calendar year for the population 
Sector Year Number of announcements General Specific
Chemicals 2003 1 2,269,984 0
Construction & materials 2003 1 9,751,254 0
Financial services 2003 3 3,957,525 4,036,431
Industrial goods & services 2003 13 8,708,092 12,818,331
Investment instruments 2003 5 0 346,995,327
Media 2003 2 2,870,008 0
Real estate 2003 1 271,450 0
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Table 2 (cont.). Total share repurchase announcements per sector per calendar year for the population 
Sector Year Number of announcements General Specific
Retail 2003 1 19,337 0
Technology 2003 5 5,807,049 7,599,638
Travel & leisure 2003 2 11,670 0
Construction & materials 2004 1 10,219,548 0
Debt 2004 1 2,500 0
Financial services 2004 6 31,893,704 0
Industrial goods & services 2004 5 35,245,554 8,958,956
Insurance 2004 3 7,446,627 35,376,184
Personal & household goods 2004 1 0 9,374,251
Real estate 2004 1 95,000 0
Banks 2005 4 10,164,515 0
Basic resources 2005 2 1,850,000 0
Chemicals 2005 1 174 0
Financial services 2005 3 5,123,166 0
Industrial goods & services 2005 7 42,753,897 12,564,726
Insurance 2005 8 422,077,803 0
Investment instruments 2005 1 4,512,667 0
Media 2005 1 7,119,825 0
Personal & household goods 2005 7 3,626,973 10,066,376
Retail 2005 2 91,388,559 0
Telecommunications 2005 2 12,086,920 0
Banks 2006 1 1,305,000 0
Basic resources 2006 4 33,487,214 38,331,012
Financial services 2006 5 37,628,271 21,540,000
Food & beverage 2006 3 1,971,298 0
Healthcare 2006 3 130,312,734 0
Industrial goods & services 2006 5 37,385,407 37,691,443
Insurance 2006 3 85,884,600 0
Investment instruments 2006 3 8,064,000 300,000
Oil & gas 2006 1 0 60,111,477
Personal & household goods 2006 9 46,956,394 0
Retail 2006 3 38,654,400 0
Telecommunications 2006 1 3,506,619 0
Travel & leisure 2006 1 427,855 0
Banks 2007 1 6,370,888 0
Basic resources 2007 3 72,870,529 0
Financial services 2007 1 13,876,793 0
Food & beverage 2007 2 5,575,513 0
Industrial goods & services 2007 4 7,195,974 68,771
Insurance 2007 1 44,023,149 0
Retail 2007 3 21,630,199 0
Telecommunications 2007 2 83,128 0
Travel & leisure 2007 1 8,994 0
Banks 2008 4 1,258,735 0
Basic resources 2008 3 237,025,800 428,347
Chemicals 2008 1 1,895,592 0
Construction & materials 2008 4 55,360,362 3,769,252
Financial services 2008 1 8,211,988 0
Industrial goods & services 2008 1 0 6,922,314
Insurance 2008 1 26,362,870 0
Oil & gas 2008 1 0 31,500,000
Real estate 2008 1 1,740,178 0
Retail 2008 2 15,020,000 0
Technology 2008 3 876,670 0
Telecommunications 2008 1 7,627,206 0
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Table 2 (cont.). Total share repurchase announcements per sector per calendar year for the population 
Sector Year Number of announcements General Specific
Travel & leisure 2008 1 0 1
Basic resources 2009 2 0 70,519,719
Construction & materials 2009 1 14,046,443 0
Consumer services 2009 1 1,826,705 0
Debt 2009 1 100,000 0
Financial services 2009 1 1,343,305 0
Healthcare 2009 3 0 475,265,611
Industrial goods & services 2009 3 30,215,750 45,607,175
Insurance 2009 2 45,734,584 0
Real estate 2009 1 4,991,335 0
Retail 2009 2 21,500,000 5,674
Telecommunications 2009 1 0 243,500,011
Basic resources 2010 2 2,049,573 0
Construction & materials 2010 5 1,740,018 51,600,000
Financial services 2010 2 3,287,171 0
Food & beverage 2010 1 0 968,105
Healthcare 2010 2 0 34,681,301
Industrial goods & services 2010 3 2,123,775 33,967,693
Retail 2010 2 46,079,832 0
Technology 2010 2 14,004,426 0
Banks 2011 1 0 9,949,367
Basic resources 2011 5 4,393,864 5,458,930
Construction & materials 2011 2 550,000 948,900
Food & beverage 2011 1 8,984,469 0
Industrial goods & services 2011 9 6,195,218 99,036,210
Media 2011 1 4,991,374 0
Retail 2011 5 16,354,311 843
Technology 2011 2 682,000 5,815,363
Telecommunications 2011 2 0 91,871,052
Construction & materials 2012 2 22,085,788 0
Consumer services 2012 1 340,000 0
Financial services 2012 3 7,705,774 169,287
Industrial goods & services 2012 12 14,324,984 1,424,780
Investment instruments 2012 2 9,000,000 35,765,285
Real estate 2012 3 32,623,899 0
Technology 2012 2 188,000 11,482,801
Total 264 1,989,334,759 1,866,490,944
To compare the difference in the total number of 
shares repurchased during the test period between a 
general and specific repurchase, it was noted that 
the difference amounts to 122,843,815 shares. Table 
3 below presents the JSE sectors that have been the 
most active in repurchasing their shares during the 
test period based on the number of announcements. 
This Table is shown to provide context in relation to 
the sector and total number of shares repurchased 
over the test period. 
Table 3. Distribution of JSE sectors that repurchased shares 
Sector Total number of shares repurchased Number of announcements
Industrial goods & services 443,209,049 62
Financial services 138,773,415 25
Basic resources 466,414,988 21
Retail 250,653,155 20
Insurance 666,905,817 18
Personal & household goods 70,023,994 17
Construction & materials 170,071,565 16
Technology 46,455,947 14
Investment instruments 404,637,279 11
Banks 29,048,505 11
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Table 3 (cont.). Distribution of JSE sectors that repurchased shares 
Sector Total number of shares repurchased Number of announcements
Telecommunications 358,674,936 9
Healthcare 640,259,646 8
Real estate 39,721,862 7
Food & beverage 17,499,385 7
Travel & leisure 448,520 5
Media 14,981,207 4
Chemicals 4,165,750 3
Oil & gas 91,611,477 2
Consumer services 2,166,705 2
Debt 102,500 2
Total 3,855,825,702 264 
It was noted in Table 3 that the industrial goods and 
services sector rank highest with the most number of 
announcements. The financial services sector made 
the second highest number of share repurchase 
announcements and consisted of asset managers, 
investment services firms, speciality finance and 
consumer finance firms. The basic resources sector 
made the third highest number of share repurchase 
announcements. It was also found that the industrial 
goods and services sector has made the highest 
number of share repurchase announcements but the 
insurance sector repurchased the largest number of 
shares in the test period, followed by healthcare and 
basic resources sectors. 
In comparison to Table 3 above, the JSE sectors in 
the final sample that have been the most active in 
repurchasing their shares during the test period 
based on the number of announcements is shown in 
Table 4 below. The table is ranked based on the 
number of repurchase announcements in the final 
sample. The difference in the type of 
announcements is indicated to show which sectors 
perform more ‘general share repurchases than a 
‘specific’ share repurchases.
Table 4. Number of repurchase announcements in final sample per sector 
Sector Number of shares repurchased Number of general announcements Difference in type of announcements
Industrial goods & services 163,001,072 37 25
Financial services 108,753,241 20 5
Retail 172,214,871 13 7
Construction & materials 113,753,413 12 4
Personal & household goods 50,583,367 12 5
Basic resources 259,553,965 11 10
Technology 21,558,145 10 4
Banks 19,099,138 10 1
Insurance 459,715,432 7 11
Telecommunications 23,303,873 6 3
Food & beverage 16,531,280 6 1
Real estate 39,355,412 5 2
Investment Instruments 21,576,667 4 7
Media 14,981,207 4 0
Healthcare 130,312,734 3 5
Consumer services 2,166,705 2 0
Travel & leisure 436,849 2 3
Debt 102,500 2 0
Chemicals 1,895,592 1 2
Oil & gas 0 0 2
Totals 1,618,895,463 167 97
The following Section provides the findings and 
discussions based on the three research questions. 
Research Question 1: Are there abnormal returns 
associated with share repurchase announcements on 
the JSE? 
Figure 1 below shows the graph of the daily 
Cumulative Abnormal average Return for the final 
sample. The graph indicates that from days (t-20) to 
(t-16) before the repurchase announcement, the 
share prices where trending downwards with a slight 
recovery on day (t-15). Share prices stabilized for a 
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few days further until day (t-7) after which the share 
prices trend upwards until day (t-3). The graph 
shows a second decline from days (t-3) to the event 
day (t 0) after which there is a steep increase in the 
share price until day (t+7). Another decline is 
observed until day (t-9) after which there is a 
gradual upward trend of the share price until the end 
of the event window (t+ 20). 
Fig. 1. Daily CAAR for the final sample
The results from the graph above indicate an 
observable trend of price increase from the 
announcement day (t 0). The result is, therefore, 
consistent with the signalling theory and 
“announcement effect” that share repurchase 
announcements are associated with positive returns. 
A parallel comparison of the daily AAR and CAAR 
analysis throughout the event window, with day 0 as 
the event day, defined as the day a share repurchase 
announcement was made. A 100% benchmark 
parameter was set on day (t-1) which was used to 
measure the CAAR from the announcement day (t 0) 
to the end of the event window (t+20). 
Further analysis of the results indicated that the 
difference in the CAAR for the event period (t-20,  
t +20) was 3.81% and the difference in the AAR for 
(t-20, t+20) was 0.46%. This indicates a positive 
return during the event period. Although the AAR 
on day (t 0) was negative, indicating that on the day 
of the announcement, the market reacted negatively, 
we observed that there was a positive reaction noted 
for the CAAR and AAR in the period (t 0, t+2) = 
0.51% and 0.66%, respectively. The difference in 
the CAR for the event period (t-20, t+20) was 
1.42% and for (t 0, t+2) was 1.18%. 
The results indicated that share repurchase 
announcements are associated with positive AARs and 
CAARs (0.46% and 3.81%, respectively) over the 
event period (t-20, t+20). As a result this indicates that 
there was a higher gain in relation to the benchmark 
which provides support that an “announcement effect” 
exists, thereby supporting the findings of Isa et al. 
(2011) and Lin et al. (2011) who noted positive 
differences in the CAR (1.44% and 0.52%, 
respectively) for the event period (t-20, t+20). 
Panel A in Table 5 below shows a summarized 
version on the parallel comparison of the daily AAR 
and CAAR analysis throughout the event window. 
A 100% benchmark parameter is set on day (t-1) 
which was used to measure the CAAR from the 
announcement day (t 0) to the end of the event 
window (t+20). Panel B in the table below indicates 
that the difference in the CAAR and AAR for the 
event period (t-20, t+20. This indicates a positive 
return during the event period. Although the AAR 
on day (t 0) is negative indicating that on the day of 
the announcement, the market reacted negatively. 
Table 5. Daily AAR and CAAR for the final sample 
Panel A: Average abnormal returns and cumulative average abnormal returns around the share repurchase announcement for the final sample 
(01/01/2003 – 31/08/2012) (N = 167 share repurchase announcements) 
Pre-announcement period Post-announcement period 
Day AAR CAAR Day AAR CAAR
t-20 0.11% 98.82% t+1 0.13% 99.97%
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Table 5 (cont.). Daily AAR and CAAR for the final sample 
Panel A: Average abnormal returns and cumulative average abnormal returns around the share repurchase announcement for the final sample 
(01/01/2003 – 31/08/2012) (N = 167 share repurchase announcements) 
Pre-announcement period Post-announcement period 
Day AAR CAAR Day AAR CAAR
t-19 -0.36% 98.46% t+2 0.45% 100.43%
t-18 -0.19% 98.36% t+3 0.14% 100.64%
t-17 -0.18% 98.10% t+4 1.03% 101.49%
t-16 -0.06% 98.04% t+5 0.18% 101.68%
t-15 0.19% 98.22% t+6 0.13% 101.81%
t-14 0.32% 98.54% t+7 0.47% 102.23%
t-13 -0.07% 98.73% t+8 -0.30% 102.07%
t-12 0.02% 98.75% t+9 -0.64% 101.40%
t-11 0.07% 98.81% t+10 0.11% 101.50%
t-10 0.07% 98.87% t+11 -0.02% 101.55%
t-9 0.05% 98.84% t+12 0.16% 101.71%
t-8 0.01% 98.85% t+13 0.03% 101.74%
t-7 0.34% 99.19% t+14 0.05% 101.86%
t-6 0.20% 99.40% t+15 -0.21% 101.65%
t-5 0.40% 99.50% t+16 0.22% 101.88%
t-4 0.10% 99.52% t+17 0.02% 101.90%
t-3 0.40% 99.92% t+18 0.25% 102.08%
t-2 0.33% 100.25% t+19 -0.11% 102.04%
t-1 -0.25% 100.00%* t+20 0.56% 102.62%
t0 -0.21% 99.92% Event day 
Panel B: AAR and CAAR over different intervals 
Event period AAR CAAR
(t 0, t+2) 0.66% 0.51%
(t-20, t+20) 0.46% 3.81%
Note: *denotes the 100% benchmark parameter used to measure the announcement effect from t 0.
The results of this section supported the studies 
conducted by Lin et al. (2011) for the “announcement 
effect” stating that share repurchase announcements 
cause a significantly positive response from the 
market. The findings are also consistent with the 
signalling theory by Grullon and Ikenberry (2000) 
which states that repurchase announcements are 
intended to convey a positive signal, indicating that 
management has correctly forecasted future cash flow 
and does not need the excess cash to cover future 
commitments such as capital expenditures or interest 
payments. Another important feature of the results is 
the continuation of the price increase for several days 
after the event. Isa et al. (2011) who conducted an 
event study on share repurchases of Malaysian firms 
also found a continuation of price increase for days 
after the event. Isa et al. (2011) point out that, 
traditionally, this observation of a price increase after 
the event is seen to be inconsistent with the notion of 
an efficient market, however, it may be interpreted as 
being due to the market reaction of subsequent 
repurchase announcements made by the company. 
In summary, the data analyzed revealed that share 
repurchase announcements are associated with 
positive abnormal returns. The results, therefore, 
provide support for the “announcement effect” and 
signalling theory. 
Research Question 2: Is there a significant price 
effect in the pre-announcement period?
H0: There is no significant difference between the 
means of the AAR in the post-announcement period 
and pre-announcement period. 
H1: There is a significant difference between the 
means of the AAR in the post-announcement period 
and pre-announcement period. 
It was clear that in the pre-announcement period, 
AARs are loosely distributed around the mean of 
0.07%. In the post-announcement period, AARs are 
tightly concentrated around mean of 0.13% as 
depicted in Table 6. This indicates that there was a 
price effect in the post-announcement period that is 
stronger than in the pre-announcement period. 
Table 6. Paired samples statistics 
Mean N Std. deviation Std. error mean
Pair 1 
AARs - Post 0.0132 20 0.003444 0.000770
AARs - Pre 0.00074 20 0.002190 0.000490
Investment Management and Financial Innovations, Volume 13, Issue 1, 2016
202
The table below shows the results of the paired samples t-test.
Table 7. Paired samples test 
Paired samples test
 Paired differences
t Df p-value
Mean Std. deviation Std. error mean 
95% confidence interval of the difference 
Lower Upper
Pair 1 (AARs – Post) –
(AARs – Pre) 
0.000584 0.004544 0.001016 -0.001542 0.002711 -0.575 19 0.572 
Using the paired sample test (see Table 7) the test 
resulted in a p-value of 0.572 which indicates that 
the sample evidence is statistically not significant at 
the 5% level. The data provide evidence that the null 
hypothesis (H0) cannot be rejected. Thus, a decline 
in share price has no significant difference when 
comparing to the post-announcement period. 
By testing the means in both periods, we found that 
the mean AAR in the pre-announcement period was 
lower than the mean in the post-announcement 
period, indicating the existent of a “price effect”. A 
paired sample t-test was conducted to determine the 
significance level of the two data sets. The pre-
specified significance level of alpha (Į) = 0.05 and a 
higher p-value = 0.572, revealed that there was 
insufficient evidence to conclude in favor of the 
alternative hypothesis. The return in the pre-
announcement period was noted as -0.20% while the 
t-value = 0.575. 
In summary, the data analyzed provided evidence in 
support of the null hypothesis which states that there 
was no significant difference between the means of 
the Average Abnormal Return (AAR) in the post-
announcement period and pre-announcement period. 
This indicated that there was no significant “price 
effect” in the pre-announcement period. Although 
we found some evidence of a “price effect”, the 
results indicate that it is not significant at the 5% 
level.  The results of this section provided support to 
the findings of Yook (2010) who also found that 
firms that make share repurchase announcements 
did not experience a “price effect”. 
Research Question 3: Do firms display market 
timing ability when repurchasing their shares?  
H0: There is no significant difference in timing share 
repurchase announcements. 
H1: There is a significant difference in timing a 
share repurchase announcement. 
Examining the trend of general share repurchase 
announcements during the sample period, it was 
noted that there has been a decline in the number of 
share repurchase announcements since its peak of 
thirty three announcements in 2006. The lowest 
number of share repurchase announcements, seven, 
was recorded in 2009. The average number of 
general repurchase announcements was seventeen.  
The distribution of share repurchase announcements 
during the sample period was analyzed to determine 
the frequency of announcements per calendar year 
and for the final sample. Three sub-windows [(t-20, 
t-1), (t 0, t+2), (t 0, t+20)] were defined which were 
used to measure the short-term price performance 
within the overall event window. A one-sample  
t-test was used to compare the mean of the final 
sample AAR in each sub-window to the known 
value which was the population mean. The pre-
specified significance level of alpha (Į) = 0.05 and a 
higher p-value for each sub-window = 0.239, were 
0.474 and 0.076 respectively, which revealed that 
there was insufficient evidence to conclude in favor 
of the alternative hypothesis. However, further 
analysis per calendar year revealed support for the 
alternative hypothesis in 2005, sub-window (t 0,  
t+20) and, in 2010, sub-window (t 0, t+2). 
These results, thus, suggest that shares in companies 
making a share repurchase announcement were not 
significantly under-performing the market. It was 
also noted that none of the pre-event AARs (t-20,  
t-1) was significant, although three years (2007, 
2009 and 2012) show negative returns within this 
window period.  
The average AAR value for the three day event 
window (t 0, t+2) was 0.14% which is higher than in 
the 20 day period (t-20, t-1) mentioned above. The p-
value (0.474) was not significant although further 
analysis revealed an observable increase in the CAAR 
during these three days (t 0, t+2). In 2010, a p-value of 
0.005 was noted, indicating evidence of timing the 
repurchase announcement. However, in the 21-day 
window (t 0, t+1) for 2010, the average AAR is 0.01% 
with a p-value of 0.720, which was not significant. 
The 21-day AAR (t 0, t+20) was 0.12% with a  
p-value of 0.076, which was significant. A p-value
of 0.013 has been noted in 2005 during the 21-day 
window indicating evidence of timing ability. Table 
8 below shows the abnormal share prices 
surrounding the event day by sub-window and 
calendar year based on the number of 
announcements recorded. 
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Table 8. Abnormal share price performance surrounding the event day by sub-window and calendar year 
Year Sample size Description 
Sub-window 
(t-20, t-1) (t 0, t+2) (t 0, t+20)
Final sample 167 
AAR 0.07% 0.14% 0.12%
p-value 0.239 0.474 0.076
2003 18 
AAR 0.14% 0.33% 0.30%
p-value 0.713 0.616 0.563
2004 11 
AAR 0.02% 0.00% 0.20%
p-value 0.866 0.995 0.226
2005 25 
AAR 0.12% 0.06% 0.18%
p-value 0.146 0.771 0.013*
2006 33 
AAR 0.02% -0.03% 0.03%
p-value 0.835 0.901 0.766
2007 13 
AAR -0.09% 0.27% 0.11%
p-value 0.592 0.368 0.378
2008 16 
AAR 0.11% -0.04% 0.08%
p-value 0.441 0.926 0.565
2009 7 
AAR -0.08% 0.41% 0.12%
p-value 0.766 0.605 0.428
2010 13 
AAR 0.07% -0.13% 0.01%
p-value 0.466 0.005* 0.878
2011 13 
AAR 0.18% 0.28% 0.04%
p-value 0.052 0.253 0.780
2012 18 
AAR -0.01% 0.69% 0.18%
p-value 0.923 0.323 0.271
Notes: * denotes that the p-value is lower than the significance level alpha = 0.05, which means that the null hypothesis (H0) is 
rejected and the alternative hypothesis (H1) is accepted. 
Based on the results in Table 8, the data provide 
evidence that the null hypothesis (H0) cannot be 
rejected for the sample as a collective. However, for 
the sub-windows (t 0, t+20) and (t 0, t+2) that have 
been noted in 2005 and 2010, respectively, the null 
hypothesis (H0) can be rejected and the alternative 
hypothesis (H1) can be accepted. 
Although some support for the alternative 
hypothesis was found in the sub-windows for 2005 
and 2010, overall, the data indicate that managers do 
not time their repurchase programs. The support for 
the alternative hypothesis found in 2005 could be 
attributed to the upward trend of the market in the 
boom years rather than pure timing ability. 
Conversely, support for the alternative hypothesis 
found in 2010 could be attributed to the recovery 
years when markets are characterized unstable and 
volatile returns where managers would be expected 
to show skill in timing the repurchase programs. 
In summary, the analysis of the data indicates that: 
1. Consistent with the signalling theory and 
“announcement effect”, share repurchase 
announcements on the JSE are associated with 
positive abnormal returns. 
2. Although there may be an observable trend of 
declining prices in the pre-announcement period 
of a share repurchase, the decline in the share 
price has no significant difference when 
compared to the Average Abnormal Return in 
the post-announcement period. 
3. There is no significant difference in timing a share 
repurchase announcement, indicating that 
managers do not time their repurchase programs. 
4. Research limitations
The research focused only on companies listed on the 
main board of the JSE. The JSE is the only stock 
exchange in South Arica and is, therefore, the only 
stock exchange used in this study. The findings may 
only apply to these companies listed on the main board 
of the JSE to the exclusion of private companies.   
Only the time period from 2003 to 2012 was 
included in this research. The initial years when 
share repurchases were allowed on the JSE have 
been excluded. Therefore, the results of this study 
are representative of historical periods. Due to 
availability of the data, the research focused on 
companies that were listed and remained listed by 
the end of the test period of 31 August 2012. 
Companies that have been delisted over the test 
period for whatever reason were excluded, thus 
exposing the study to survivorship bias. 
Conclusion 
The study examined the existence of an 
“announcement effect” when a share repurchase 
announcement is made by a listed companies on the 
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JSE. The results indicated that share repurchase 
announcements are associated with positive 
Average Abnormal Returns and Cumulative 
Abnormal Returns over the event period (t -20,  
t+20). As a result this implies that there is a higher 
gain in relation to the share price before an 
announcement is made, which is indicative of an 
“announcement effect” and provides support to the 
signalling theory. The findings of this South African 
study is, therefore, consistent with those of similar 
studies done by Grullon and Ikenberry (2000) on the 
US market, Isa et al. (2011) on the Malaysian market 
and Lin et al. (2011) on the Taiwanese market. 
The existence of a price effect also investigated to 
determine if companies that repurchase their shares 
experience a significant price decline before an 
announcement was made. Although there was an 
observable trend of declining prices in the pre-
announcement period of the event, the decline in the 
share price was not statistically significant. This 
result is consistent with Yook (2010) who also 
found that US firms that make share repurchase 
announcements did not experience a “price effect”. 
The results also indicated that there was no significant 
difference in timing a share repurchase announcement, 
indicating that managers do not time their repurchase 
programs which is consistent with Ginglinger and 
Hamon (2007) who studied French firms. 
Implications of the study 
Share repurchases can be used as a tool for 
stabilising a company’s share price that has been 
following a downward trend. Managers executing a 
share repurchase program should consider the 
effects of timing ability to protect the investments of 
long-term shareholders. Isa et al. (2011) point out that 
when the market is on an uptrend, there is no necessity 
for a company to signal under-pricing or make an 
effort to stabilize the price until there is a long enough 
period of consecutive declines in the price.  
The findings contained in this study may also be used 
by investors, portfolio managers and share analysts 
who may regard share purchase announcements as a 
positive signal. Saville (2012) points out that a 
share repurchase program demonstrates that a 
company has surplus cash and that managers see 
opportunity in their own share. From investor’s 
perspective value, a share repurchase program conveys 
a very strong signal of a healthy company as it leads to 
upliftment of financial ratios such as return on equity, 
price-to-book multiple and future earnings prospects. 
Recommendations for future research
Future research should be conducted on the 
announcement effect between various industry sectors 
to determine if the abnormal returns are significantly 
different. This study can also be expanded to compare 
the abnormal returns of country specific sectors, for 
example the abnormal returns of the announcement 
effect in the South African insurance, industrial goods 
and services and basic resources sectors, as these were 
noted to be outliers during the sample period. 
Only the time period from 2003 to 2012 was included 
in this research. The initial years when share 
repurchases were allowed on the JSE have been 
excluded. Any future research on share repurchase 
programs in South Africa should aim to overcome 
this data constraint by being extended to include the 
earlier years of data, i.e., 2000, 2001 and 2002. 
The period of this study coincides with the boom 
years of financial markets (2003-2007), the global 
financial crisis (2008-2009) and the recovery years 
(2010-2012). This provides a landscape for future 
studies to test market behavior in relation to share 
repurchases and examine the market’s reaction in 
each of these periods as a form for robustness check. 
Isa et al. (2011) point out that this will indicate if the 
market is consistent in its response to the event 
regardless of market situations. 
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